🛡️Security Properties & Risks

This page elaborates on the claimed security properties, as well as known risks, of the continuum model.

Risks unique to the continuum L1 architecure, boil down to the use of a single sequencer in v1 (we're exploring sequencer rotation for future version, but low latency remains a top priority). The sequencer is heavily constrained, cryptographically (VDF for timekeeping + blind order commitments), so the risk profile is different from naive single sequencer models (eg. L2s like Arbitrum, Optimism). Nevertheless its important to highlight two classes of risk, and what can be done to mitigate them over the long run. 1. Liveness Risk The sequencer is designed to auto rotate when a collective of validators vote that a leader is unreachable for >50ms. This is intended to be a rare occurrence, and can lead to slashing.

1. Indiscriminate Censorship / Griefing

This risk comes down to the fact that while the sequencer cannot perform targetted sandwiching, it could indisriminately drop transactions (eg. drop 20% of txns randomly). The crux of this risk is that its deterimental to the network but not beneficial to the sequencer (negative-sum), so a rational sequencer shouldn't engage in this. Secondly, it is more easily detetected than targetted censorship - thus can easily lead to slashing and rotation of the sequencer.